Question One. Whether Grace was Conferred in Circumcision by Force of the Circumcision

335. This part of this distinction, where the Master determines about circumcision (“It was, however^), is an incidental one.

336. I ask one thing about it: whether grace was conferred in circumcision by force of the circumcision.

337. That it was not:

Romans 4.11, “He received the sign of circumcision”, on which the Gloss says, “Sins there were only forgiven, but grace as an aid for acting well was not made available.”

338. Again Augustine Narrations On Psalms 73 n.2, on the title of the Psalm, “Why have you repulsed God to the limit?”, says about the sacraments of the Old Law, “They only promised and prefigured salvation; but these (namely the sacraments of the New Law) give salvation.”

339. Again, circumcision did not open the gate of Heaven, as Bede holds in his Homilies on Luke on Luke 2.21, “After the completion of eight days.” He says that the gates of the Kingdom are open to him who has grace, because he is an heir. For, according to Augustine On the Trinity 18.32, “Grace separates the children of the Kingdom from those of perdition.”

340. Again, by reason as follows: a sacrament only causes what it signifies; circumcision only signifies a taking away and not anything positive, because only the taking away of part from whole is there;     therefore etc     .

341. On the contrary:

Augustine in his book On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.11 n.24 (and it is in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.4 ch.6), “From when circumcision was instituted among the people of God for the purgation of this old sin, it was valid for old and young, just as baptism began to be so from when it was instituted.” This would not be the case unless grace was there conferred;     therefore etc     .

342. Again, Bede Homilies on the Gospels 1.11, on Luke 2.21, “Circumcision in the Law gave the same help for salvific cure as baptism is wont to give in the time of grace.”

I. To the Question

A. Circumcision Removed Original Sin

343. It must be supposed here as certain that circumcision removed original sin; it is plain from the authority of the saints [nn.341-342].

344. And for this there is a fitting reason, because God at no time left the human race without a remedy necessary for salvation, especially those to whom he gave the Law so that, by observing it, they might attain to salvation. For such a Law would have been given in vain without such a remedy. Therefore, in the time of the Mosaic Law he gave some such remedy to those who observed that sort of Law. But they could not attain to salvation without deletion of original guilt (which is a supposition from Ord. II d.29 n.24); therefore God instituted some remedy against that guilt. This remedy, and nothing else, seems to be instituted there as such a remedy for guilt, according to Genesis 17.914, where circumcision was given to Abraham, and this many hundreds of years before the Mosaic Law was given on Mt. Sinai. But this does not prevent circumcision being a remedy for original sin. But that God wanted to institute it before the Mosaic Law argues that it was not a remedy belonging precisely to that law. But neither did the Law abolish it; rather it confirmed it.

B. Whether Grace was Conferred in Circumcision

345. But something else must be inquired into, whether on the basis of this supposition it necessarily follows that grace is conferred in circumcision. And because the deletion of guilt is the conferring of grace, whether conjointly or separately, and because these regard only divine power while something is said to be possible for God in two ways, namely as to absolute power or ordained power - then one must consider, first, whether God can by his absolute power delete original guilt without infusion of grace and, second, whether he can do so by his ordained power.

1. Whether God Can by his Absolute Power Delete Original Guilt without Infusion of Grace

a. The Opinion of Richard of Middleton

α. Exposition of the Opinion

346. As to the first point there are some who seem to say no.

347. But we must consider if their reasons prove it. The first reason is as follows: Sin cannot be deleted from the soul unless the soul be made pure from being impure. But this cannot be done save by some change introduced into the soul. This change will necessarily be to some positive form that is repugnant to guilt, and this an absolute form, for there is no motion or change to relation, Physics 5.2.225b11-13. An absolute form of this sort repugnant to guilt I call ‘grace’;     therefore etc     .

348. The second reason: there is in sin a deformity opposed to grace as privation is opposed to habit; but a privation cannot be taken away save by the conferring of the opposite habit;     therefore etc     . And this is what Augustine argues, that guilt and grace are opposed as light and darkness in the air [Augustine, Enchiridion 3 n.11, 4 n.14].

349. The third reason: guilt can only be deleted if it is not imputed for punishment. But if its disordering remains, it is necessarily imputed for punishment, because while it remains it cannot be otherwise ordered than through infliction of punishment.     Therefore guilt cannot be dismissed unless its disordering is taken away. But it is only taken away by grace; therefore etc     .

350. The fourth reason is as follows: if guilt is dismissed, the divine offense is removed;     therefore the sinner is reconciled to God, and is consequently accepted by God; but he is not accepted without grace; therefore etc     . And there is a confirmation, because if he is not an enemy, then he is a friend.

β. Rejection of the Opinion

351. I argue against this opinion [n.346].

First as follows: all things that are repugnant to each other as to the same thing, exclude each other as to that thing. Therefore, that to which many things are repugnant as to some subject can be excluded from that subject by any one of them. But rectitude in pure natural state is repugnant to original guilt even without grace. The thing is plain as to the fact according to the Master, who posits that man was made thus by God. It is plain too by reason as to possibility, because if nature could not be made right by natural rectitude and without grace, then grace would be natural, though not to fallen nature but to nature instituted in its proper rectitude; for that is natural which is consequent to nature in itself. Therefore it follows that guilt can be removed by natural rectitude alone and without grace.

352. If it be said that rectitude could exist absolutely in nature without grace, yet after guilt it could not be restored save by the conferring of grace - against this, and at the same time in answer to the principal conclusion [n.346], I argue thus: a form that does not include in itself the being of some other nature is not otherwise inseparable from anything. For it is because a form is the sort it is and is possessed of the sort of being it has that it is     therefore separable or inseparable from anything. But a form in a subject does not include in itself the being of another nature from the fact that its opposite has preceded it in that subject (as is plain of cold and heat in water). Therefore , a form is not otherwise inseparable from anything by the fact that its opposite has preceded it in that subject. But natural rectitude, though it had not preceded its opposite, could be separated from grace according to you; therefore etc     . [n.352].That is: because natural rectitude can exist without grace (as you admit it did before the fall), it does not include the idea of grace in itself. So it is separable from grace, and it does not cease to be so separable just because its opposite (guilt) existed in its subject, namely the soul, through the fall. So natural rectitude can exist in the soul again after the fall with the same separability from grace, that is, it can exist there again without grace. ⁸

353. Again, whatever man God can create according to his absolute form, him can God also precisely repair after guilt according to his absolute form; but God can precisely create man in pure natural rectitude;     therefore etc     . The proof of the major is that guilt does not make nature to be different in itself;     therefore neither does it make it not to be capable of the same things as it was capable of before. But a divine agent can impress on nature whatever it is capable of, and that without anything that is not included in the idea of what is impressed upon, and especially if this was not included in it before the form was impressed; but grace is of this sort with respect to justice or natural rectitude; therefore etc     .

354. If objection is raised against the major that, according to Jerome, God cannot make a virgin from a non-virgin, and yet he could from the beginning have formed or created a man a virgin - my reply is: I have taken in the major [n.353] ‘any man in his absolute form’, and the objection is not relevant here, because if one takes anything absolute that is introduced by virginity, whether it be perfection in the mind or disposition in the flesh, God can repair the whole of it. But virginity states, over and above this, a certain negation of a preceding act, namely that of never having fallen in flesh or mind into a sin of the flesh; and from the fact the act happened in the past God cannot make it that it did not happen in the past. Hence the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139b8-11 commends the saying of Agathon who rightly says, “From God is taken even this alone, to now undo what is already done.” And the reason is that there can be no making of a not-being from a not-being, because (extending ‘making’ to its greatest extent), any making is of being from not-being, or of not-being from being (as in annihilation), or of being from being; but the past is a not-being and ‘it did not happen’ is another not-being; therefore from something past cannot be made that it was not past.

355. But if the objection is raised, ‘if God can restore the whole absolute that was in virginity, therefore he can give the golden crown, for the golden crown seems to correspond with some absolute perfection in virginity’ - one can say that the golden crown of virginity is an accidental joy in one’s innocence, namely of never having fallen into that sin to which nature is commonly prone, above all in adolescence.

356. And if it be objected that this negation is not of a very excellent or special joy - I reply: as the affirmation is something to flee from or hate, so is the negation something to love. Therefore, as ‘to have fallen into such sin’ is something excellent to hate so ‘never to have fallen’ is something to love from charity and to delight in. Therefore, although essential joy is about some positive good, indeed about the greatest good, it is however not unacceptable for some accidental joy to be added to it negatively afterwards. For never to have fallen into guilt adds an amount of joy beyond what one has in having risen to grace after guilt.

γ. Scotus’ own Conclusion

357. I concede, therefore, the conclusions of these last reasons [nn.351-353], that God could of his absolute power dismiss original guilt without conferring grace, and this above all because grace is not formally opposed to original sin, and because that sin is not now dismissed by conferring of grace save because grace includes, equivalently or prevalently, in divine acceptation the original innocence that is formally opposed to original sin.

δ. To the Arguments for the Opinion

358. As to the first argument for the preceding opinion [n.347], I concede that cleanness could be made from uncleanness with an opposed cleanness if the original justice that original sin takes away is restored (whether the justice is a gift superadded to nature or is the whole of natural rectitude), that is, if it cuts off the whole deformity of sin.

359. As to the second [n.348], it is plain that the proposition about the opposition of guilt to grace is false; rather the guilt is opposed thus to original justice, and only to grace because grace is equivalent in divine acceptation to original justice. But in no way is the guilt opposed to grace as being properly and precisely the privation of grace.

360. As to the third [n.349], there is a doubt whether guilt is able not to be imputed for punishment if guilt’s disorder is not taken away. But, if it is conceded not thus to be able to, the disorder can be taken away without the conferring of grace.

361. As to the fourth [n.350], I concede that divine offense is placated, and that he whose sin is remitted is reconciled. But it does not follow that ‘therefore he is accepted by God with that special acceptation with which he is accepted through grace’. For man in his pure natural state was in peace with God, but not specially accepted, that is, not worthy of eternal life; for peace and reconciliation only state that God does not wish to avenge the original guilt; but ‘to accept’ states something more, namely ‘to ordain man as worthy of eternal life’ [Ord. I d.17 n.129]. The fact is plain even in our case; for I can be placated by someone who has offended me, so as not to be enemy to him or to wish to avenge what he has done, without receiving him into a special friendship by which he would be ordered to some special good.

b. A Doubt

362. But there remains still a doubt whether God could, of his absolute power, dismiss original sin without conferring anything repugnant to that sin, namely original justice or something of the sort.

363. And it seems that he could not, for the three reasons given before about privation and change and disorder [nn.347-349], and especially by the one about man not having original justice necessarily having a lack of that justice and having too a debt to have it, if he is propagated from Adam.

364. My proof of the last point:

For a man is for this reason a debtor for that justice, because he who is naturally propagated from Adam receives the debt in Adam. But lack of this justice together with the debt to have it completes the idea of original sin [Ord. II dd.30-32 n.53]; therefore, it is simply necessary that he who is propagated from Adam has original sin, if original justice is not given to him in itself or in something equivalent.

365. Again, it was proved in Ord. 1 d.17 (nn.114-118, 129, 133-135) that charity is in the soul through the change that is brought about in justification of the sinner; but if a sinner could be justified or reconciled to God without that change, the middle terms in those arguments [ibid. nn.129, 131] would not prove the conclusion. Therefore, if one speaks consistently with what was said there, one must posit that a sinner could not be reconciled to God without change to an absolute form, and that form will be repugnant to the term ‘from which’, and consequently it will be grace, as was argued before [Ord. ibid.].

366. The first argument [n.364] raises a difficulty that must be touched on below in d.14 [q.2 nn.14-16], namely whether sin could be destroyed without inducing a new form in the soul, because if this possibility is posited about original sin, as perhaps will be said there [ibid.] about actual sin, one could say to the argument that not everyone propagated from Adam is, because so propagated, a debtor for original justice, but that he is a debtor because, together with being propagated from Adam, God wishes him to be held to that justice. But God could wish him to be held to that justice without any positive and absolute form in him, as will be touched on there [d.14 q.1 n.4].

367. As to the second [n.365], one can consistently say next that in the justification of a sinner there is a privative change whereby from an enemy he becomes a non-enemy. There is also another change, a positive one, whereby from unworthy of eternal life he becomes worthy of eternal life, and from not being able to act meritoriously he becomes able to act meritoriously. Although one cannot conclude from the first change that there is some new form involved in justification, yet one can from the second (and thus was it argued in Ord. I d.17 nn.121-124, 146-153, 163-164). For a sinner is not now worthy of eternal life again, nor now able to act meritoriously again, unless he has some new form whereby he is worthy and can act.

2. Whether God could do the Same by his Ordained Power

a. Opinions of Others

368. Now as to ordained power [n.345] the position is held, because of the authorities of the saints, which seem to deny grace to the sacraments of the Old Law (as was said in the opposing arguments [nn.337-339]), that God does even in fact destroy original guilt without infusion of grace.

369. Others say that circumcision was instituted for removing original sin principally, but for conferring grace as a consequence; and to this extent is circumcision said not to confer grace, because it did not do so by its principal intention but only concomitantly.

b. Scotus’ own Opinion

370. On this point I hold that it is not possible, by ordained power, for original sin or any other sin to be removed without infusion of grace, because although it is possible absolutely, without contradiction, for there to be a mean in species between a son of the Kingdom and a son of perdition (namely a man in pure natural state), yet according to the law of divine wisdom there was, after the fall, no mean between someone with grace, who is a son of the Kingdom, and a sinner, who is a son of incarceration.Nor can there be such a mean when speaking of ordained power, that is, of power conformed to the laws determined by divine wisdom and will. And therefore God frees no one from guilt, nor can he so free anyone, unless he gives him grace.

371. I add too, against the second opinion [n.369], that grace is principally intended in circumcision. My proof is that someone acting according to right reason more principally intends perfection than he intends lack of defect or lack of imperfection, since he only intends the lack because of the imperfection. When instituting circumcision, therefore, God, since he acts according to right reason, more principally intends its positive perfection (that is grace) than its lack of imperfection (that is, lack of original sin).

372. Third, because of the confirmation of the first opinion and the authorities of the saints [nn.368, 337-339], I state how the saints understand that the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace, for a sacrament (as said before [nn.252]) can be taken properly or improperly.

373. And indeed in that Law there were many things improperly called sacraments, as cleansings from uncleannesses contracted according to law (as is plain in Leviticus [11-17, 24-28] about purgation from contact with dead things by water of expiation, and cleansing from leprosy and other things of the kind). There were also sacraments there improperly so called that were different from others, yet approached more to perfection [Leviticus 1-7]. Of this sort were the offerings of sacrificial victims, for these pertained to the cult of worship during the time in which God wished to be so worshipped. Both these groups, namely cleansings and sacrifices or offerings, were called ceremonies properly and sacraments improperly.

374. And about these I concede that they caused grace as efficacious signs in respect to grace, in the way that was explained in the definition of a sacrament [nn.309-322].

375. But whether grace was conferred through them by way of merit is matter for doubt, and some seem to deny that grace was conferred in such deeds done out of love. For this does seem too harsh: for who would deny that he who observes a divine precept out of love and obedience did not merit in so observing? It also seems an irreverent statement, to say that God gave someone a precept and did not want his observance of it to have merit, however much love and obedience he observed it with.

376. Now precepts were given in that law about the ceremonies, both the cleansings and the offerings, as is plain in many places [Leviticus, 3-15, 17, 24-28], and sometimes it seems from the text that they are precepts necessary for salvation, as, “Whoever omits to be washed by this water, that soul will perish from the people” [Numbers 19.20]. And this threat is never given save to designate a transgression of mortal sin. Therefore the Jews, by observing from charity these sacraments improperly so called, merited grace, or an increase in it if they already had it.

377. But not on this account were they properly sacraments. For a sacrament confers grace by virtue of the work worked, so that there is not required in it a good interior movement that would merit grace, but its only requirement is that the receiver not interpose an obstacle. But in these acts of the Old Law grace was not conferred from the fact alone that the receiver interposed no obstacle, but was conferred only by virtue of the good interior movement as by way of merit.

378. But besides these, there was in the law also circumcision, which was properly a sacrament. Hence the Master too [Sentences IV d.1 ch.6-7] excepts circumcision from Augustine’s universal remark on Psalm 73 [Narrations on Psalms, Psalm 73 n.2, “The sacraments of the New Testament give salvation; the sacraments of the Old Testament promised the Savior”]. For circumcision conferred grace by virtue of the work worked after the manner of a sacrament, and not by virtue of the work of the worker and by interior movement.

379. And yet if there be sayings of the saints who deny grace to those sacraments and that refer not only to the ceremonies but also to circumcision [nn.337-339], I reply:

These sayings can be understood in two ways: either because circumcision conferred little grace in comparison with baptism (the reason for this will be given in d.2 n.36), or because it did not confer grace as an immediate disposition for glory, because it did not open the gate [of heaven] (but this was not from a defect in it but because it proceeded at a time when the price was not paid).

Or in a third way it did not confer grace, because it did not do so universally to everyone who received it. But it was perhaps determined by divine institution for a certain degree of grace, so that it could not go beyond that degree either by intending or inducing it, and thus, if it found so much grace in the receiver, it conferred nothing on him.

380. And this last way seems to be the Master’s intention, for he says [Sentences IV d.1 ch.9 n.5] that “sins alone were dismissed there, and grace was not given by it;” and he adds at once, “as in baptism.” And the mode he expresses at once, “because, however just a man comes to baptism, he receives there a richer grace;” hence baptism generally intensifies the grace found to be already possessed. “But it is not so in circumcision; hence Abraham, already justified, received it as a sign only, for it conferred nothing on him interiorly,” because the grace of Abraham had already attained or surpassed the degree to which circumcision was determined. And I understand “it conferred nothing on him” to mean by way of sacrament or by virtue of the work worked, because I believe that his obedience in circumcising himself that proceeded from charity was very meritorious for him, as was also his sacrifice of Isaac [Genesis 17.9-27].

381. And if it is then objected that circumcision was not properly a sacrament, for it was not a sign that was certain since it did not always have, by force of the work worked, a concomitant conferring of grace - I reply that a sacrament signifies with certitude that grace is then either in a state of becoming (unless an obstacle is interposed) or in a state of being. Just as, if the Blessed Virgin, in the conception of her Son, had been in the supreme fullness of grace that God had disposed her to reach, then, if she had been baptized afterwards, she would have received in it no grace anew; and yet her baptism would not have been there a false or uncertain sign, because it would signify that grace was then either in a state of becoming or that a previously caused grace was in a state of being.

II. To the Initial Arguments

382. From these remarks the answer is plain to all the authorities adduced in argument on the principal point [nn.337-388]. For either they are speaking of the sacraments improperly so called of the Old Law or, if they are speaking of circumcision, which was properly a sacrament, they deny that it confers grace according to some aforesaid understanding [nn.372-381].

383. To the third argument [n.339], on the opening of the door [of heaven], I say that it was not a defect of circumcision that it did not open the door, but it was current at a time when the price was not paid. For, after the price was paid, the door could have been opened to anyone, not because he had been baptized, but only circumcised and in a state of grace. But for someone baptized but dead before the Passion the door would not have been opened at that time.

384. To the last argument [n.340] I say that even baptism, as to the exterior act, signifies only the removal of bodily uncleanness, and yet no one denies that something positive is its effect. I say then to the major of the argument that a sacrament signifies more properly the effect in the soul on which grace in the sacrament follows than that it signifies the grace itself. Hence, while grace is single in a single soul, yet the sacraments are distinguished according to the proper things they signify, which are diverse effects of the same grace, as will be said later [when speaking of each sacrament]. However the effect of grace, the one proper both to circumcision and to baptism, is the washing of the soul from sin, although there is another concomitant effect, namely ordination or acceptation to eternal life.